Term Sheet Example: A Series A Term Sheet Annotated Clause by Clause

A typical Series A term sheet example, following Y Combinator's public template, sells preferred stock at a post-money valuation that includes the option pool, with a 1x non-participating preference, noncumulative dividends, broad-based anti-dilution, protective provisions, a founder-majority board, a capped legal fee and a 30-day binding no-shop. The rest is non-binding.

About this example

The example below is a Series A preferred stock term sheet for a fictional Delaware corporation, called ExampleCo here. Its structure and its standard terms follow Y Combinator's public one-page Series A template, which YC describes as standard and clean terms from a good Silicon Valley investor. Where a term below is YC's default, it is labelled as such.

Every amount, valuation, pool size and share count on this page is an illustrative placeholder, chosen so the arithmetic is easy to follow. None of it is market data or a benchmark for your round.

Each clause is shown in short form, followed by what it does and what to check.

Deal terms: what is being sold, and at what price

Example text. Company: ExampleCo, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Securities: Series A Preferred Stock. Investment amount (illustrative): $8 million from the lead investor and $2 million from other investors, $10 million in total. Outstanding SAFEs and convertible notes convert on their terms into shadow series of preferred stock. Valuation (illustrative): $50 million post-money, including an available option pool equal to 10% of the post-closing fully diluted capitalization.

What the valuation line actually means

Post-money means the $50 million includes the new money. New investors therefore own $10 million divided by $50 million, or 20%, of the fully diluted company after closing. If the post-closing fully diluted count were 12,500,000 shares (illustrative), the price would be $4.00 per share and the investors would buy 2,500,000 shares.

The pool and the converting SAFEs come out of everyone else. In this illustration, if converting SAFE holders end up with 8%, founders and other existing holders keep 100% minus 20% minus 10% minus 8%, or 62%. Any increase needed to reach the 10% pool dilutes only the existing holders, not the new investors. Check this line against a modelled pro forma cap table, because it moves founder ownership more than any other clause.

Economic rights

Example text. Liquidation preference: 1x non-participating; a sale of the company is treated as a liquidation. Dividends: 6% noncumulative, payable only if and when declared by the board. Conversion: at the holder's option, and automatically on an IPO or with approval of a majority of the preferred, initially one to one. Anti-dilution: broad-based weighted average. All four are YC template defaults.

Liquidation preference, worked through

Non-participating means the Series A holders take the greater of their money back or their as-converted share, not both. Ignoring other preferred series for simplicity: in an illustrative $30 million sale, 20% would be $6 million, so they take their $10 million preference. In an illustrative $100 million sale, 20% is $20 million, so they convert and share pro rata. Check for anything above 1x, or for participation, which YC's commentary lists as non-standard.

Dividends, conversion and anti-dilution

Noncumulative dividends that are paid only if declared rarely produce cash at a startup; cumulative dividends, which YC also flags as non-standard, would build up a growing claim. Automatic conversion on an IPO lets the capital structure collapse into common stock. Broad-based weighted average anti-dilution adjusts the conversion price moderately if a later round is priced lower; check that the draft does not say full ratchet, which reprices the preferred all the way down to the new price.

Control

Example text. Protective provisions: approval of a majority of the preferred is required to change the preferred's rights, change the authorised shares, create senior or equal securities, redeem or repurchase shares, declare dividends, change the number of directors, or liquidate or sell the company. Board: the lead designates one director and the common stockholders designate two, which is YC's bracketed default. Drag-along: founders, investors and 1% holders vote for a sale approved by the board, the preferred majority and a majority of common.

What to check

YC's commentary calls the vetoes over new financings and over a sale the most consequential, because they let the preferred block both. The board line decides who controls the company day to day; YC contrasts its founder-friendly two common and one investor seat with a two, two and one structure, which it identifies as a common way founders lose board control. In the drag-along, check whether the common majority excludes shares that came from converted preferred, a bracketed option in YC's form.

Founders, employees and process

Example text. Founder vesting: to be completed in the bracket. Employee vesting: four years, monthly, with a one-year cliff. Other rights: first refusal and co-sale over founder transfers, registration rights, pro rata rights and information rights. Company counsel drafts the documents, and the company pays the lead's legal fees, capped at $30,000. No-shop: for 30 days the company will not solicit or accept offers for its stock or assets, and the no-shop is the only binding provision.

What to check

Founder vesting is left blank in YC's form because it is negotiated: whether existing founder shares re-vest, over what period, and with what acceleration on a sale. The fee cap and the 30-day no-shop are YC's defaults; an uncapped fee clause or a longer exclusivity period is a negotiating point, not boilerplate. Note what is missing too: this example has no redemption right, warrant coverage or super pro rata, all of which appear in some investor forms.

Adapting the example for a seed round

A priced seed round has the same skeleton with fewer rights. Short-form packages such as the Series Seed documents are built to carry fewer investor rights than a full Series A set, and a seed board is often founder-controlled. The valuation arithmetic, the liquidation preference logic and the importance of the no-shop are identical.

This page is an educational illustration built from a public template, not legal advice and not a form to sign. A real term sheet should be drafted and reviewed with counsel against your actual cap table.

Frequently asked questions

What does a standard Series A term sheet look like?
Y Combinator's public template fits on one page and covers the security, amount, post-money valuation and pool, a 1x non-participating preference, 6% noncumulative dividends, conversion, broad-based weighted average anti-dilution, protective provisions, drag-along, board composition, vesting, a legal fee cap of $30,000 and a 30-day binding no-shop. Longer forms such as the NVCA model add alternatives.
How do you calculate investor ownership from a term sheet?
With a post-money valuation, divide the new investment by the post-money figure. An illustrative $10 million at $50 million post-money gives the new investors 20% of the fully diluted company. With a pre-money valuation, add the new money to the pre-money first. Then check what the fully diluted base includes, especially the pool and converting SAFEs.
What does 1x non-participating liquidation preference mean?
On a sale or liquidation, the preferred holders receive the greater of their original investment back or what they would get by converting to common, but not both. In an illustrative $30 million sale, investors holding 20% would take their $10 million back; in a $100 million sale they would convert and take 20%.
Which terms in an example term sheet are usually negotiated?
Price, round size and option pool are always negotiated, and YC marks the board composition and founder vesting as bracketed points too. Beyond those, check the preference multiple, participation, anti-dilution formula, protective provisions, fee cap and no-shop length, because departures from the standard versions shift economics and control toward investors.